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A commentary on
Evidence of weak conscious experiences in the exclusion task
by Sandberg, K., Del Pin, S. H., Bibby, B. M., and Overgaard, M. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:1080. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01080
Most studies of unconscious perception aim to demonstrate that the participants are unaware of
the prime stimuli (e.g., a measurement of zero sensitivity on prime detection, discrimination, or
identification) yet show evidence of perception on another variable (e.g., semantic priming). Disso-
ciation studies of this kind are popular, but the approach has an inherently weak logic. The problem
is the need to establish that the awareness measure is exhaustively sensitive to conscious percep-
tion (Reingold and Merikle, 1988). The exhaustiveness issue is critical. If exhaustiveness cannot
be demonstrated, any findings suggesting unconscious perception can be plausibly attributed to a
Type II statistical error (a failure to measure a real effect on the awareness measure) and are open
to alternative interpretations.
Sandberg et al. (2014) investigated this exhaustiveness issue by comparing two different meth-
ods of measuring awareness in an unconscious perception paradigm. The Perceptual Awareness
Scale (PAS) is a direct report of stimulus awareness that is expressed on a four point scale (1: no
experience, 2: weak glimpse, 3: an almost clear experience, and 4: A clear experience; Ramsøy
and Overgaard, 2004). The PAS was compared to an exclusion task that required the partici-
pants to intentionally respond in ways that did not match the presented prime stimuli (Debner
and Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995). Exclusion task results are interpreted as evidence for
unconscious perception if the participants match the prime and response at elevated rates (i.e.,
exclusion failure; an inability to follow instructions presumably due to unconscious perception).
Sandberg et al. found significantly elevated prime—response exclusion matches on trials that
were rated 1 (“no experience”) or 2 (“weak glimpse”) on the PAS. Exclusion failure at the 2 rat-
ing suggested that exclusion failure should not always be interpreted as evidence of unconscious
perception because exclusion failure can occur when there is a weak degree of stimulus aware-
ness. The investigators concluded that the PAS is more sensitive (exhaustive) to the presence
of conscious perception than the exclusion task. If this is true, then the conclusions of previ-
ous studies (e.g., Debner and Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995; Smith and Bulman-Fleming,
2004; Matsumoto et al., 2005; Lamy et al., 2008) that interpreted exclusion failure as evidence
of unconscious perception may be in doubt because the findings may be partly attributable to
conscious perception. Another important implication is that direct measures of awareness (PAS)
may be more sensitive than indirect measures (exclusion), which is contrary to the views of some
investigators.
Fisk and Haase Exclusion tasks lack sensitivity
We would like to support Sandberg et al.’s conclusions by
adding that we have obtained similar findings in an experiment
that compared an exclusion task to word discrimination perfor-
mance (Fisk and Haase, 2007; Experiment 3). The participants
observed masked word or nonword stimuli that were presented
for 75ms. Half of the trials contained words; the other half, non-
words. Prime sensitivity was determined after each presentation
by asking the participants to indicate the presence of a word on
a word-nonword discrimination scale that ranged from 1 (“No
word was presented”) to 6 (“Yes, a word was presented”). The
second response on each trial was an exclusion task. The results
from the word trials showed that exclusion failure did not occur
at the low discrimination ratings. In contrast, the exclusion fail-
ure rate was above baseline and consistent for trials with ratings
three through six. This latter result is similar to Sandberg et al.
in that exclusion failure was accompanied by evidence that the
prime stimuli were consciously perceived. The word/nonword
discrimination sensitivity this experiment was da = 0.74, which is
well above the zero sensitivity expected for null awareness. When
exclusion failure and word-nonword discrimination sensitivity
were compared in separate blocks of trials exclusion failure also
occurred at display settings with significant prime discrimination
sensitivity (58ms; da = 0.35; 75ms; da = 0.82; Experiment 2).
Overall, these results are consistent with Sandberg et al. in show-
ing that a direct measure of stimulus perception is more sensi-
tive to the influence of conscious perception than the exclusion
task.
Although these studies reached similar conclusions, there
were some noteworthy differences in the results. In particular,
Sandberg et al. found exclusion failure effects at the lowest level
of the PAS (1—“no experience”), but our study (2007, Experi-
ment 3) found no evidence of exclusion failure at the lower lev-
els of the discrimination rating scale (“1” and “2” ratings; “See
Figure 3B of Fisk and Haase, 2007”). Methodology differences
may partly explain the discrepancies. The key difference is in
the task requirements: the PAS emphasizes reporting stimulus
awareness or experience, whereas our word discrimination task
emphasized confidence that a word was displayed (i.e., distin-
guishing words from nonwords). There were other methodol-
ogy differences too, such as the stimulus displays (0–200ms vs.
75ms), stimuli presented on the trials (all words vs. 50% words
and 50% nonwords) and setting baseline responses (0ms vs. non-
word trials). Aside from the above differences it is not entirely
clear why Sandberg et al. found exclusion success (nonmatch-
ing, proper performance) at higher ratings of the PAS whereas
our results were essentially the opposite (i.e., exclusion failure—
matching—at the higher ratings of word discrimination confi-
dence). We, too, have found exclusion success at high ratings in
a 2AFC exclusion task (Haase and Fisk, 2001; Fisk and Haase,
2006). Although there are clear differences between these stud-
ies, we would like to emphasize again that the general approach
and the main conclusions of both studies—that exclusion fail-
ure is sometimes accompanied by significant conscious percep-
tion of the target stimuli—are essentially the same. Sandberg
et al.’s research provides converging evidence that is an important
contribution to our understanding of the influence of conscious
awareness in the exclusion task paradigm.
Early advocates of using the exclusion task and the Pro-
cess Dissociation Procedure for studying unconscious perception
argued that this approach was advantageous because it circum-
vented the need to establish null awareness and exhaustive sensi-
tivity (Jacoby and Kelley, 1992; Merikle and Joordens, 1997). In
contrast, accumulating evidence from Sandberg et al. and oth-
ers (Snodgrass, 2002; Fisk and Haase, 2006, 2007, 2013; Bengson
and Hutchison, 2007) increasingly suggests that exclusion tasks
lack validity for studying unconscious perception. Exclusion
failure effects may represent weak conscious perception rather
than unconscious perception. Therefore, we feel that investi-
gations of unconscious perception would be better served by
using direct ratings of stimulus awareness such as the PAS or
other traditional measures, such as detection, identification, and
discrimination.
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